Battle of Hostomel as it Unfolded

Antonov Airport, also known as Hostomel Airport, is a major international cargo airport located in Hostomel, just outside the capital city of Kyiv, Ukraine. It was owned and operated by the Antonov State Enterprise, a Ukrainian state-owned aerospace and air defense company. The airport housed the only Antonov An-225 Mriya airplane in the world, and served as an airstrip for the Ukrainian Air Force.

Due to its proximity to Kyiv, around ten kilometers away, Hostomel Airport held strategic importance. Prior to the Russian invasion, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) obtained detailed information about Russian attack plans. CIA Director William J. Burns visited Ukraine in January 2022 and informed Ukrainian leadership that Russia intended to capture Antonov Airport for establishing an airbridge, enabling Russian forces to swiftly move into Kyiv and neutralize the government.

Who:

Russian Armed Forces

Russian Airborne Forces (VDV)

Russian Special Forces, particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade

11th Guards Air Assault Brigade

31st Guards Air Assault Brigade

 Russian Air Force

 National Guard of Russia

141st Motorized Regiment (“Kadyrovites”)

Ukrainian Armed Forces

Ukrainian Ground Units, including the Ukrainian National Guard and special forces

Ukrainian Air Force

7th Tactical Aviation Brigade

40th Tactical Aviation Brigade

 Ukrainian Air Assault Forces

 Ukrainian Ground Forces

72nd Mechanized Brigade

Georgian Legion

Special Operations Forces

3rd Special Purpose Regiment

 Territorial Defense Forces

 National Guard of Ukraine

4th Rapid Reaction Brigade

 Security Service of Ukraine

Alpha Group

Irregular civilian volunteers (militia)

What:

A Russian airborne assault on Hostomel Airport near Kiev, Ukraine, as part of a plan to swiftly end the “special military operation” in the country.

When:

The attack occurred on February 24, 2022, on the first day of the conflict.

Where:

Hostomel Airport (also known as Gostomel or Antonov Airport), located a few miles northwest of Kiev, Ukraine.
50° 35′ 27″ N, 30° 12′ 27″ E

Why:

The Russian forces believed that seizing Hostomel Airport would allow them to use their airlift capability to quickly transport troops, armor, artillery, and ammunition into Kiev, leading to the overthrow of the Ukrainian government.

How:

The Russian attack on Hostomel Airport involved a three-hour aerial assault using attack helicopters and fighter jets to weaken Ukrainian defenses. Once the airport’s guards were overcome, Russian paratroopers were deployed via assault transport helicopters to take control of the airport. However, an intelligence failure regarding the strength of Ukrainian defenses and a belief in token resistance led to significant resistance from Ukrainian special forces and local fighters. The inability to establish air superiority and delay Ukrainian reinforcements ultimately resulted in the failure of the operation and a significant setback for the Russian offensive in Ukraine.

Battle of Hostomel from a Military Assessment

The Battle of Hostomel was a crucial engagement during Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine, which aimed to swiftly seize control of the country. The operation centered on the bold Russian airborne assault on Hostomel Airport, located near the capital, Kiev. This military assessment provides an in-depth analysis of the battle, highlighting key factors that contributed to its outcome.

Objective: The primary objective of the Russian forces was to capture Hostomel Airport and use it as a strategic base to launch an assault on Kiev, ultimately leading to the downfall of the Ukrainian government.

Execution: The attack was executed by the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), particularly the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, known for its extensive combat experience. The assault was carried out in three phases:

1. Initial Aerial Assault: On February 24, 2022, approximately 30 Russian Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, flying at low altitudes to evade radar, initiated the attack. They launched guided missiles and fired 30mm cannons at the airport’s defenses. Ukrainian resistance was fierce, resulting in the downing of several Russian helicopters. Russian Sukhoi Su-25 “Frogfoot” jet fighters also joined the assault. Despite their efforts, the attack continued for three hours.

2. Airborne Troop Deployment: Following the initial aerial assault, a wave of Mi-8 “Hip” assault transport helicopters arrived, carrying Russian airborne troops. The goal was to disperse the small unit of Ukrainian National Guard defenders, making way for at least 18 Ilyushin Il-76 air-transports that were enroute. The Russian plan relied heavily on swift airborne reinforcement and a takeover of the airport.

3. Ukrainian Counterattack: The Russian forces faced significant resistance from Ukrainian special forces, including the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and the 3rd “Prince Svyatoslav” Special Forces Regiment, alongside local partisan fighters. A critical moment occurred when a skilled sniper killed Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, the chief-of-staff of the Russian Airborne, causing a setback to the Russian command.

Results

The Battle of Hostomel was a significant failure for the Russian forces due to several key factors:

1. Intelligence Failure: The Russian command underestimated the strength of Ukrainian defenses around Hostomel Airport. The presence of significant first-line Ukrainian forces within easy reach of the airport caught the Russian forces off guard.

2. Overconfidence: The Russian forces believed that only token resistance would oppose their occupation of the airport and the swift airlift of reinforcements. This led to a lack of preparation for a more substantial counterattack.

3. Inability to Establish Air Superiority: The Russian forces faced resistance from Ukrainian aircraft and anti-tank missiles, preventing them from achieving air superiority over the battleground.

4. Lack of Contingency Plan: The failure to foresee and plan for potential setbacks or the need for alternative strategies left the Russian forces vulnerable during the critical phases of the operation.

The Battle of Hostomel serves as a lesson in the perils of overconfidence and intelligence failures in military operations. The Russian airborne assault on Hostomel Airport was a bold endeavor, but it ultimately faltered due to the unforeseen resilience of Ukrainian defenses and a lack of adaptability in the face of fierce resistance. This battle dealt a significant blow to the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine, highlighting the importance of thorough intelligence assessments and contingency planning in future military endeavors.

Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, based on information from Russian sources, learned that the invasion would commence on 24th February, with Antonov Airport as the main target. Analysts believed that the Russian leadership anticipated Ukraine’s disarray and collapse, allowing Russia to install a puppet government.

However, the CIA’s warning, along with the intelligence from Denys Kireyev, a banker, helped the Ukrainian military prepare for the attack.

The airport had a small garrison of approximately 300 National Guard troops, as most forces had been deployed to the eastern frontline. The Antonov State Enterprise initially obstructed the garrisoning and defense setup, but the airport was fully garrisoned by the Ukrainian military on 23rd February, a day before the Russian invasion.

On February 24, 2022, President Putin announced a “special military operation” aimed at “demilitarizing and denazifying” Ukraine. At around 5:30 am local time, a formation of 20 to 34 Russian helicopters arrived at Antonov Airport in Hostomel, a suburb of Kyiv, with the objective of securing the airport and creating an airbridge for the deployment of troops and equipment near Kyiv.

The helicopter formation included Mi-8s carrying Russian airborne troops, potentially from the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade and/or the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, escorted by Ka-52 attack helicopters. Videos captured by civilians and soldiers showed the Russian helicopters flying low along the Dnieper River and coming under fire from Ukrainian small arms and MANPADS. The Russian helicopters deployed flares to counter the attacks, but several were hit and crashed into the water. At least one Ka-52 was shot down, with its two pilots ejecting.

The Ukrainian 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade intercepted the formation with five Mikoyan MiG-29s, reportedly shooting down two more helicopters and harassing Russian air support.

Upon arriving at Hostomel, the Russian helicopters launched rocket attacks on the airport to pave the way for the airborne landing. The initial rocket bombardment destroyed some Ukrainian air defenses precisely, leading Ukrainian officials to suspect the involvement of a Russian intelligence operative within the airport. However, the attack did not significantly weaken the Ukrainian defenses around the airport.

The Russian airborne units disembarked and began capturing the airport. The Ukrainian defenders, consisting of approximately 300 poorly equipped soldiers, including inexperienced draftees, offered limited resistance. One Ukrainian national guardsman, Serhiy Falatyuk, shot down a Russian helicopter with a 9K38 Igla, boosting the morale of the conscripts.

As the fighting intensified, the Ukrainian air defenses became more effective. The helicopter of Russian commander Capt. Ivan Boldyrev was hit and forced to make an emergency landing. With the arrival of more Russian paratroopers and their spread across the airport, the Ukrainian garrison was overwhelmed, leading to the capture of the airport by the Russian forces.

Despite overcoming the initial Ukrainian resistance, the Russian paratroopers continued to face opposition from armed civilians and the 3rd Special Purpose Regiment. The Ukrainians also launched heavy artillery bombardments on the airport. Ukrainian General Valery Zaluzhny recognized the threat posed by the Russian bridgehead in Hostomel and ordered the 72nd Mechanized Brigade under Col. Oleksandr Vdovychenko to launch a counter-attack.

At a critical moment in the battle, the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the National Guard, supported by the Ukrainian Air Force, launched a large-scale counter-attack. The Russian forces, lacking armored vehicles, relied on air support to fend off the Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian warplanes, including at least two Su-24s and a MiG-29, provided air support alongside surviving Ukrainian aircraft. The Ukrainians quickly deployed reinforcements, including the Georgian Legion and a unit of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces. The ongoing battle prevented the Russian Il-76 strategic airlifters, carrying reinforcements, from landing at the airport, potentially forcing them to return to Russia.

Ukrainian military units surrounded the airport and pushed back the Russian forces by the evening, forcing the remaining Russian paratroopers to retreat to forests outside the airport. Mamuka Mamulashvili, the commander of the Georgian Legion, claimed that his men ran out of ammunition and resorted to using his car to run over retreating Russian paratroopers. The 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade later posted an image on their Facebook page, showing their soldiers celebrating the victory while holding a Ukrainian flag riddled with bullet holes.

During the opening phase of the battle, the Antonov An-225 Mriya, the world’s largest airplane, was present at the airport. Initially, an Antonov pilot confirmed that the aircraft remained intact despite the fighting. However, on February 27, a Ukroboronprom press release claimed that the Mriya had been destroyed by a Russian airstrike.

On March 4, Russian state-owned television channel “Channel One Russia” aired footage confirming the destruction of the Mriya.

On February 25, 2022, Russian mechanized ground forces advancing from Belarus, combined with another air assault by the VDV (Russian airborne troops), took control of Antonov Airport after partially breaking through Ukrainian defenses at the Battle of Ivankiv. Although some of the armored vehicles were ambushed before reaching Hostomel, Russian reinforcements eventually entered the airport and assisted in expelling the Ukrainian defenders. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the capture of the airport involved around 200 helicopters and resulted in about 200 Ukrainian casualties with no casualties on the Russian side. However, this claim was met with skepticism, as eyewitnesses and journalists present at the battle disputed these numbers.

Initially, the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs denied that the airport had been fully captured by Russian forces, stating that it had been “changing hands” and that the battle was ongoing. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense declared that the airfield was too damaged to be used by Russian troops. However, later in the day, Ukraine confirmed that Russian forces were in control of the airport.

The battle for Antonov Airport was considered a failure for the Russian forces and described as a “Russian Airborne Disaster” by security analyst Andrew McGregor. The Russian intelligence had underestimated the concentration of Ukrainian defenders around the airport and expected only token resistance. The initial landing force was too small to hold the locality, and Russian forces were unable to secure air transport for reinforcements or prevent Ukrainian counter-attacks. This led to the destruction of the first landing force and prevented Russia from swiftly concluding the invasion.

The ability of the Ukrainian defenders to hold the airport for two days was seen as a significant factor in preventing a rapid capture of Kyiv by Russia. The battles for the airport and the city of Hostomel were described as breaking the back of the Russian assault on Kyiv. It showcased the failures of the Russian military during the invasion, including difficulties with main weapon systems, logistics, coordination, planning, leadership, and training.

While the fall of the airport was considered a major victory for the Russians, it also had negative consequences for the Ukrainian forces. Artillery fire aimed at the runway and disembarkation sites delayed the Russian landing and frustrated their plan to capture Kyiv. The airport served as a hub for storing equipment and housing troops, with Russian forces partially restoring the landing fields for aircraft use in the following days.

After the initial capture of Antonov Airport by Russian forces, Ukrainian forces continued to engage the Russian forces in the nearby town of Hostomel. Eyewitnesses recorded videos showing a Russian tank column burning in the distance, and Ukrainian Mi-24 helicopters firing rockets at Russian positions. Ukrainian forces allegedly deployed BM-21 Grad rocket launchers in Kyiv to bombard Russian forces at the airport.

On February 26, the Ukrainian Alpha Group unit claimed to have destroyed a column of Russian armored vehicles near Hostomel. There were also reports that Russian Spetsnaz (special forces) had captured Ukrainian National Guard members and were wearing their uniforms. Ukrainian officials urged citizens and fighters to speak only in Ukrainian to help identify Russian saboteurs.

As of February 27, the airport remained under Russian control, but clashes started to shift to the towns of Bucha and Irpin to the south. Ukrainian forces claimed to have halted Russian advances and were engaged in intense fighting in Hostomel. The Security Service of Ukraine released an intercepted conversation of Russian forces in Hostomel reporting casualties and requesting evacuation. Ukrainian forces bombarded the airport with artillery and claimed to have destroyed Russian equipment, vehicles, and personnel.

In the following days, a Russian military convoy arrived at the airport in preparation for an assault on Kyiv. The airport was partially repaired but was not used as an airstrip. Instead, it served as a forward operating base, housing equipment and troops.

Satellite imagery as of March 28 showed no Russian forces inside the airport. On March 29, the Russian Deputy Minister of Defense announced a withdrawal of Russian forces from the Kyiv area, including the abandonment of Hostomel Airport.

By April 2, Ukrainian forces had regained control of the airport following a large-scale Russian withdrawal along the Kyiv axis. During their hasty retreat, Russian troops destroyed much of their own equipment, while some equipment was captured intact by the Ukrainians. Ukrainian artillery strikes had also destroyed Russian equipment prior to the withdrawal. Overall, Russia lost several armored fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, field artillery pieces, helicopters, trucks, vehicles, and jeeps at Antonov Airport.

Sequence of events at Battle of Hostomel  – Step-by-Step Outline:

Date: February 24, 2022

Time: 5:30 am local time

1. Intelligence Gathering:

   – The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) obtains detailed information about Russian attack plans and warns Ukraine.

   – Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov learns from Russian sources that the invasion will commence on February 24th, with Antonov Airport as the main target.

2. Preparation and Garrisoning:

   – The Ukrainian military prepares for the attack based on the CIA’s warning and intelligence from Denys Kireyev, a banker.

   – Hostomel Airport is fully garrisoned by approximately 300 Ukrainian military personnel on February 23, a day before the Russian invasion.

3. Russian Helicopter Formation Arrives:

   – A formation of 20 to 34 Russian helicopters, including Mi-8s carrying Russian airborne troops, arrives at Antonov Airport.

   – The helicopter formation is potentially from the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade and/or the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade, escorted by Ka-52 attack helicopters.

4. Helicopter Engagement:

   – Ukrainian small arms and MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) fire at the Russian helicopters, leading to several being hit and crashing into the water.

   – The Ukrainian 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade intercepts the formation with five Mikoyan MiG-29s, reportedly shooting down two more helicopters and harassing Russian air support.

5. Rocket Attacks and Airborne Landing:

   – Russian helicopters launch rocket attacks on the airport to pave the way for the airborne landing.

   – Russian airborne units disembark and begin capturing the airport.

   – The Ukrainian defenders, consisting of approximately 300 poorly equipped soldiers, offer limited resistance.

6. Russian Paratroopers Overwhelm Ukrainian Garrison:

   – As the fighting intensifies, the Ukrainian air defenses become more effective.

   – Russian Commander Capt. Ivan Boldyrev’s helicopter is hit and forced to make an emergency landing.

   – With the arrival of more Russian paratroopers, the Ukrainian garrison is overwhelmed, and the airport falls to Russian forces.

7. Ukrainian Counter-Attacks:

   – The 3rd Special Purpose Regiment and armed civilians continue to resist the Russian paratroopers.

   – Ukrainian General Valery Zaluzhny orders the 72nd Mechanized Brigade under Col. Oleksandr Vdovychenko to launch a counter-attack.

8. Ukrainian Air and Ground Counter-Attack:

   – The 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the National Guard, supported by the Ukrainian Air Force, launches a large-scale counter-attack.

   – Ukrainian warplanes, including at least two Su-24s and a MiG-29, provide air support.

   – The Georgian Legion and a unit of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces reinforce the Ukrainian forces.

   – The counter-attack prevents Russian Il-76 strategic airlifters, carrying reinforcements, from landing at the airport.

9. Russian Forces Retreat to Forests:

   – Ukrainian military units surround the airport and push back the Russian forces by the evening.

   – The remaining Russian paratroopers retreat to forests outside the airport.

Date: February 25, 2022

10. Russian Ground Forces Join the Battle:

    – Russian mechanized ground forces advancing from Belarus, combined with another air assault by Russian airborne troops, take control of Antonov Airport after partially breaking through Ukrainian defenses at the Battle of Ivankiv.

11. Claims and Counter-Claims:

    – The Russian Ministry of Defense claims the capture of the airport involved around 200 helicopters and resulted in about 200 Ukrainian casualties with no casualties on the Russian side. These numbers are disputed by eyewitnesses and journalists present at the battle.

12. Hostomel Airport Under Russian Control:

    – The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs initially denies that the airport has been fully captured by Russian forces but later confirms Russian control.

Date: March 29, 2022

13. Russian Withdrawal:

    – Russian Deputy Minister of Defense announces a withdrawal of Russian forces from the Kyiv area, including the abandonment of Hostomel Airport.

    – Satellite imagery shows no Russian forces inside the airport.

Date: April 2, 2022

14. Ukrainian Regains Control:

    – Ukrainian forces regain control of Antonov Airport following a large-scale Russian withdrawal along the Kyiv axis.

    – Ukraine captures intact Russian equipment and destroys some equipment left behind by the retreating Russian troops.

The Battle of Hostomel (Antonov Airport) was a critical moment in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with both sides experiencing victories and setbacks. While the airport ultimately fell to Russian forces, the Ukrainian defense at Hostomel played a significant role in delaying the Russian advance toward Kyiv and disrupting their plans for a swift takeover of the capital. The battle also exposed weaknesses in the Russian military’s planning and execution.

First Days of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine – Military Analysis and Implications

Based on information available at the time of February 24, 2022, the following provides a comprehensive analysis of the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine including a focus on Hostomel, outlining key developments, military strategies, and potential consequences. The aim is to facilitate understanding and appreciation of the complex situation at the time.

February 22, 2022: Escalation of Tensions

On February 22, Russian President Vladimir Putin orchestrated a strategic move by setting the stage for a future military operation against Ukraine. He established a framework to execute this operation at his discretion, indicating Russia’s intention to seize more territory in eastern Ukraine in the imminent days. This decision prompted the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to release its analysis of Russia’s probable immediate actions on the same day at 1:00 pm ET.

Vladimir Putin’s actions also included his acknowledgment of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as encompassing the entirety of the respective Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (provinces). Furthermore, he secured unbounded formal parliamentary approval for the deployment of Russian forces beyond its borders. This move effectively paved the way for an upcoming offensive against Ukraine.

In response, the United States and its European allies interpreted Putin’s recognition of the DNR and LNR as an outright invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, they swiftly imposed initial rounds of sanctions as a punitive measure. Ukraine, under the threat of escalated Russian aggression, appealed for more stringent sanctions against Russia and sought military support from Western nations, underscoring its determination to counter further Russian encroachment.

However, Russia’s allies refrained from immediate acknowledgment of the DNR and LNR, and the global community widely condemned Russia’s actions. The repercussions of these events reverberated through the Russian stock market and currency, leading to a sharp decline in both as the Kremlin endeavored to reassure the Russian populace about the nation’s resilience against Western sanctions.

In response to these escalations, the United States redeployed its existing forces stationed in Europe to provide support to Eastern European allies, aiming to reinforce regional security against potential adversarial actions.

The events of February 22 underscored the intensification of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, indicating the potential for further military confrontations and geopolitical shifts in the days ahead.

II. Current Situation and Military Dynamics in February 2022.

1. Ukrainian Successes and Russian Limitations

   – Ukrainian forces successfully slowing Russian offensives on multiple axes, except Crimean Peninsula breakout.

   – Failure to neutralize Ukrainian air force and command and control hampers Russian advances.

2. Russian Military Superiority

   – Russian forces remain larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military.

   – Putin is likely to achieve territorial objectives with a significant cost in blood and treasure.

3. Specific Frontline Actions

   – Ukrainian forces repel Russian attempt to isolate Kyiv, recapturing Hostomel military airport.

   – Russian forces advancing from Crimea, securing Kherson city with 60 km penetration.

   – Advance towards Kyiv from Belarus, halted east of Dnipro at Chernihiv.

   – Potential envelopment strategy in Luhansk Oblast to cut off Ukrainian troops in Donbas.

III. Putin’s Motives and Messaging

1. Kremlin’s Intentions

   – Putin’s large-scale invasion aims for regime change and Ukrainian occupation.

   – Disguising invasion as “demilitarization” and “de-nazification” to mitigate domestic opposition.

2. Western Response and Sanctions

   – US and EU impose extensive sanctions on Russia’s economy, military, technology, and energy sectors.

   – Efforts to minimize impact on US and EU energy markets.

IV. International Reactions and Preparations

1. NATO and US Involvement

   – Deployment of additional forces to NATO’s eastern flank to deter spillover from the invasion.

2. Humanitarian and Refugee Concerns

   – International organizations warn of impending humanitarian crisis due to potential influx of Ukrainian refugees.

3. Internal Russian Response

   – Kremlin detains hundreds of civilians protesting the invasion.

   – Putin’s messaging geared towards unprepared Russian population.

February 23, 2022: Precursor to Invasion

Anticipated developments suggest that on February 24, President Putin will issue orders for Russian forces to enter overtly into territories controlled by Russian proxies within Ukraine. This deployment is likely to extend to the line of contact with Ukrainian forces. Subsequently, a military invasion by Russia into unoccupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts is expected to swiftly follow. Moreover, there is a possibility of a parallel or closely subsequent Russian incursion into a significant portion of the remaining Ukrainian territory.

Formally on February 23, leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), acting as Russian proxies, requested President Putin’s approval for deploying Russian forces into their territories. This move is intended to facilitate their effort to gain control over the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, which they lay claim to despite their illegitimate status. Putin’s preceding authorization on February 22 to deploy Russian forces abroad for any designated purpose provides him with unrestricted power in this matter. Such a deployment could potentially set the groundwork for a sequence of consecutive or concurrent Russian military campaigns aimed at conquering not only the complete Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but also expansive tracts of Ukrainian land.

These developments signal that the proxy leadership of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics has directly petitioned Russian President Vladimir Putin to dispatch the Russian Armed Forces into the Donbas region. This move establishes the conditions necessary for the imminent and substantial deployment of Russian ground forces into Donbas, effectively bringing them closer to the line of contact.

In the backdrop of these actions, satellite imagery and intelligence from Western sources suggest an imminent full-scale invasion, with indications of additional Russian deployments near Belgorod (close to Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine) and in Gomel, Belarus.

Russia’s state television has subtly propagated the notion that Ukraine lacks legitimate sovereignty over a significant portion of its territory. This serves to create an information environment conducive to garnering support from the Russian population for a potential invasion and subsequent occupation of Ukraine.

In response to this escalating situation, the United States has proactively dispatched additional military forces to Europe. This move aims to offer support to NATO allies and serve as a deterrent against possible Russian aggression. As a consequence of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, scheduled meetings between US and allied leaders and Russian officials have been canceled.

This series of events is also serving as a catalyst for broader geopolitical shifts. The European Union (EU) and the United States are leveraging Russia’s unprecedented aggression against Ukraine as a driving force to lessen the EU’s reliance on Russian natural gas for energy needs.

February 24, 2022

Ukrainian forces are successfully slowing Russian offensives on all axes of advance other than a Russian breakout from the Crimean Peninsula.

Russian failure to ground the Ukrainian air force or cripple Ukrainian command and control is likely enabling these initial Ukrainian successes.

Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military and Putin is likely to defeat Ukrainian regular military forces and secure his territorial objectives in the coming days or weeks if he is willing to pay the price.

Ukrainian forces defeated a Russian operation to isolate Kyiv from the west, recapturing the Hostomel military airport from Russian VDV (Airborne) troops after several counterattacks throughout the day.

Russian forces are rapidly advancing north from Crimea, securing Kherson city. Their deepest penetration to date is about 60 kilometers.

Russian forces are advancing on Kyiv from Belarus on both sides of the Dnipro River, but have been temporarily halted east of the Dnipro at Chernihiv.

Russian forces likely seek to cut off Ukrainian troops on the line of contact in Donbas using an envelopment behind the Ukrainian front lines through Luhansk Oblast. Russian frontal assaults have taken little territory in Donetsk and Luhansk at this time.

Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to obfuscate to Russian citizens that he launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine aimed at regime change, likely to mitigate blowback from a Russian population unprepared for a major war.

The United States and its European allies approved sweeping new sanctions against Russia’s economic, military, technological, and energy sectors but attempted to mitigate the possible consequences of those sanctions for US and EU energy markets.

US and NATO allies deployed additional forces to NATO’s eastern flank to deter a spillover from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

International organizations warned of a looming humanitarian crisis as states bordering Ukraine deployed troops to their borders to prepare for a possible influx of Ukrainian refugees.

The Kremlin detained hundreds of civilians across Russia for protesting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin began a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24 likely aimed at full regime change and the occupation of Ukraine. His claimed objective to “demilitarize” and “de-nazify” Ukraine is a transparent cover for an unprovoked war of aggression to occupy a neighboring state. Putin and Kremlin media continue to deny that the Russian invasion is a war, instead describing it as a special military operation. Putin’s messaging is likely aimed at a domestic Russian audience, which the Kremlin has not fully prepared for the costs of a war against Ukraine. Russian officials and state media have been denying and mocking Western warnings of the impending Russian invasion for months and as recently as February 23.  Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military. Russia will likely defeat Ukrainian regular military forces and secure their territorial objectives at some point in the coming days or weeks if Putin is determined to do so and willing to pay the cost in blood and treasure.

Ukrainian forces are successfully slowing Russian offensives on all axes of advance other than a Russian breakout from the Crimean Peninsula. Russian failure to ground the Ukrainian air force or cripple Ukrainian command and control is likely enabling these initial Ukrainian successes.

Ukrainian forces are contesting the Hostomel military airport, 20 km northwest of Kyiv, as of 9:30 pm local time. Russian VDV (Airborne) troops landed at Hostomel and have also failed to capture the Boryspil airport southeast of Kyiv. Ukraine’s contestation of the airport deprives Russian forces of any location to airlift forces onto Kyiv’s western flank overnight.

Russian forces are rapidly advancing north from Crimea, securing Kherson city. Their deepest penetration to date is about 60 kilometers.

Russian forces are advancing on Kyiv from Belarus on both sides of the Dnipro River. Russian forces secured the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (on the west bank) at 7:30 pm local time, but Ukrainian forces have slowed Russian advances east of the Dnipro at Chernihiv.

Russian forces likely seek to cut off Ukrainian troops on the line of contact in Donbas using an envelopment behind the Ukrainian front lines through Luhansk Oblast. Russian frontal assaults have taken little territory in Donetsk and Luhansk at this time.

Russian military operations began with a short and incomplete air campaign on February 24 around 4:00 am local time targeting Ukrainian air defenses, supply depots, and airfields across unoccupied Ukraine. However, portions of the Ukrainian Air Force remain operational and Ukrainian command and control appears intact. 

US defense officials estimate initial strikes comprised over 100 missiles including a mix of short and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and sea-launched missiles. An estimated 75 Russian bombers participated in the attack.

Russia did not successfully ground the Ukrainian air force or cripple the Ukrainian armed forces, enabling several Ukrainian successes on February 24. ISW incorrectly forecasted that any Russian offensive would begin with a concentrated air and missile campaign to cripple Ukrainian command and control and infrastructure.

The Russian failure to comprehensively strike key Ukrainian assets is a surprising break from expected Russian operations and has likely enabled stiffer Ukrainian defense. The Ukrainian military has shot down seven Russian aircraft and seven helicopters as of 8:00 pm local time, February 24.

Russia has not demonstrated its full air and missile capabilities and will likely conduct further waves of strikes in the coming days aimed at degrading Ukraine’s command and control and ability to redeploy forces.

February 25, 2022

Kremlin officials and Russian government media advanced the dual narratives that Ukrainian “nationalists” are the only Ukrainians fighting and that Russian forces are easily succeeding in Ukraine throughout coverage on February 25 to counteract the growing unpopularity of the war in Russia. TASS falsely claimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) forces are advancing toward the administrative borders of Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast late on February 25. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova falsely claimed Russian forces are only striking Ukrainian military infrastructure, not Ukrainian cities or civilians. Zakharova also claimed that Ukrainian “nationalists” threaten ethnic Russians with “direct reprisals” in Ukraine. Russian domestic media additionally amplified a Russian Defense Ministry announcement claiming Ukrainian nationalist battalions are destroying bridges and civilian infrastructure to prevent other Ukrainians from surrendering. Russian TV channels reported that the West and Ukraine are artificially insinuating panic across all Ukrainian cities to amplify mobilization and mass nationalist revolts by supplying Ukrainian civilians with weapons. Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Major General Igor Konashenkov claimed that Russian forces neutralized 11 Ukrainian military aircraft, 18 tanks and armored vehicles, and 211 military infrastructure facilities but did not mention Russian losses. Konashenkov also claimed that Russia’s seizure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant prevented “Ukrainian nationalists” from using the power plant to conduct a “nuclear provocation.” Kremlin media amplified false Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) claims that the Ukrainian 36th and 53rd Brigades “laid down their arms.”

Russian forces entered major Ukrainian cities—including Kyiv and Kherson —for the first time and carried out additional air and missile strikes on military and civilian targets.

Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro River as Russian sabotage groups in civilian clothing reportedly moved into downtown Kyiv.

Ukrainian forces have successfully slowed Russian troops on the east bank of the Dnipro, forcing them to bypass the city of Chernihiv after stout resistance. Russian airborne forces have concentrated in southeastern Belarus, likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.

Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkhiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24-25.

Russian forces have achieved little success through frontal assaults or envelopments against Ukrainian forces in Donbas but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east.

North of Crimea, Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.

Russian forces may be assembling in Stolin, Belarus, to open a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.

Western intelligence officials told CNN on February 25 that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to invade all of Ukraine and could install a pro-Kremlin regime within days.

Russian opposition groups and citizens opposing the Russian war in Ukraine may be laying the foundations of a coordinated anti-war movement that will be unlikely to alter Putin’s decision making but will likely provoke harsher domestic crackdowns, further eroding Putin’s domestic popularity.

The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union expanded their sanctions on Russia to target Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on February 25, but sanctions to sever Russia from SWIFT remain unlikely.

NATO activated its 40,000-troop Response Force for the first time ever on February 25 to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) announced possible investigations into alleged Russian war crimes amid Russian denials.

Russian forces entered major Ukrainian cities—including Kyiv and Kherson—for the first time on February 25. Russian forces’ main axes of advance focused on Kyiv (successfully isolating the city on both banks of the Dnipro River). Russian military operations along Ukraine’s northern border have been less well-planned, organized, and conducted than those emanating from Crimea. They have also been less successful so far. The divergence in performance likely arises in part from differences in the composition and organization of the Russian ground forces elements in the Western Military District and Belarus (to Ukraine’s north) and Southern Military District and Black Sea Fleet (to its south and east), as ISW has previously observed. Determined and well-organized Ukrainian resistance around Kyiv and Kharkiv has also played an important role in preventing the Russian military from advancing with the speed and success for which it had reportedly planned. The Russian military has deployed additional forces to southeastern Belarus, likely beyond those Moscow had planned to use against Ukraine, to offset these problems and challenges. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however. Russia will likely defeat Ukrainian regular military forces and secure their territorial objectives at some point in the coming days or weeks if Putin is determined to do so and willing to pay the cost in blood and treasure.

Russian forces entered the outskirts of Kyiv on the west bank of the Dnipro on February 25. Russian sabotage groups in civilian clothes are reportedly active in downtown Kyiv.

Russian forces have so far failed to enter Kyiv’s eastern outskirts. Ukrainian forces have successfully slowed Russian troops, which have temporarily abandoned the failed attempt to take the city of Chernihiv and are instead bypassing it.

Elements of the Russian 76th VDV (Airborne) division have concentrated in southeastern Belarus likely for use along the Chernihiv-bypass axis toward Kyiv in the next 24 hours.

Russian forces will likely envelop Kharkhiv in the next 24 hours after failing to enter the city through frontal assaults on February 24.

Russian forces have achieved little success on frontal assaults or envelopments against Ukrainian forces in Donbas but may not have intended to do more than pin Ukrainian forces in the east.

North of Crimea, Russian forces fully captured Kherson and are likely on the verge of seizing Melitopol in the east. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian forces had bypassed Kherson earlier and headed directly for Mykolaiv and Odessa.

Russian forces may be assembling in Stolin, Belarus, to open a new line of advance against Rivne in western Ukraine.

HEADLINE BBC News Russia says 200 Ukrainians ‘eliminated’ in airbase siege

“More now on reports that Russian forces have taken control of the key Hostomel airfield near Kyiv.

Some 200 Russian helicopters were involved in the operation at the airfield, also known as Antonov Airport, the Russian Defence Ministry says.

The ministry claimed that 200 troops from Ukraine’s special units were killed, adding that there were no Russian losses, according to state news agency RIA Novosti.

We have not yet heard from the Ukrainian military – and the Russian account has not been verified.

The Russian Defence Ministry says: “The success of the landing force was ensured by suppressing all air defence systems near the landing site, full isolation of the area of military action from the air and active radio electronic warfare.”

February 26, 2022

Russia has failed to encircle and isolate Kyiv with mechanized and airborne attacks as it had clearly planned to do. Russian forces are now engaging in more straightforward mechanized drives into Kyiv along a narrow front on the west bank of the Dnipro River and on a broad front to the northeast.

Russian forces temporarily abandoned efforts to seize Chernihiv and Kharkiv to the northeast and east of Kyiv and are bypassing those cities to continue their drive on Kyiv. Failed Russian attacks against both cities were poorly designed and executed and encountered more determined and effective resistance than Russia likely expected.

Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.

Russian forces in eastern Ukraine remain focused on pinning the large concentration of Ukrainian forces arrayed along the former line of contact in the east, likely to prevent them from interfering with Russian drives on Kyiv and to facilitate their encirclement and destruction.

Ukrainian forces retook the critical city of Kherson and Russian forces halted their drive on Odesa. Some Russian troops remain west of the Dnipro River and are advancing on Mykolaiv, but the main axes of advance have shifted to the north and east toward Zaporizhie and Mariupol respectively.

Russian forces have taken the critical city of Berdyansk from the west, threatening to encircle Mariupol with Russian forces in Donbas attacking Mariupol from the east, likely to pin defenders in the city.

Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.

The United States, Canada, and European allies removed select Russian banks from the SWIFT global financial network and agreed to additional measures that could significantly increase economic pressure on Russia.

The United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom facilitated a significant expansion of NATO countries’ lethal aid shipments to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began.

NATO countries began contributing forces to NATO Response Force (NRF) operations in Eastern Europe, reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is set to displace millions of Ukrainians internally and throughout eastern Europe; at least 150,000 Ukrainians have fled the country as of February 26 as urban fighting intensifies.

Kremlin censors increased crackdowns on independent media amid growing Russian opposition to the war.

Russian forces’ main axes of advance in the last 24 hours focused on Kyiv, northeastern Ukraine, and southern Ukraine. Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces from Crimea have changed their primary axes of advance from a presumed drive toward Odesa to focus on pushing north toward Zaporizhie and the southeastern bend of the Dnipro River and east along the Azov Sea coast toward Mariupol. These advances risk cutting off the large concentrations of Ukrainian forces still defending the former line of contact between unoccupied Ukraine and occupied Donbas. Ukrainian leaders may soon face the painful decision of ordering the withdrawal of those forces and the ceding of more of eastern Ukraine or allowing much of Ukraine’s uncommitted conventional combat power to be encircled and destroyed. There are no indications as yet of whether the Ukrainian government is considering this decision point.

Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations especially on the Kyiv axis have been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine may threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue unchecked.

Russia has failed to encircle and isolate Kyiv with the combination of mechanized and airborne attacks as it had clearly planned to do. Russian forces are now engaging in more straightforward mechanized drives into the capital along a narrow front along the west bank of the Dnipro River and toward Kyiv from a broad front to the northeast.

Russian forces have temporarily abandoned failed efforts to seize Chernihiv and Kharkiv to the northeast and east of Kyiv and are bypassing those cities to continue their drive on Kyiv.  Russian attacks against both cities appear to have been poorly designed and executed and to have encountered more determined and effective Ukrainian resistance than they expected.

Russian movements in eastern Ukraine remain primarily focused on pinning the large concentration of Ukrainian conventional forces arrayed along the former line of contact in the east, likely to prevent them from interfering with Russian drives on Kyiv and to facilitate their encirclement and destruction.

Russian forces coming north from Crimea halted their drive westward toward Odesa, and Ukrainian forces have retaken the critical city of Kherson. Some Russian troops remain west of the Dnipro River and are advancing on Mikolayiv, but the main axes of advance have shifted to the north and east toward Zaporizhie and Mariupol respectively.

Russian forces have taken the critical city of Berdyansk from the west, threatening to encircle Mariupol even as Russian forces based in occupied Donbas attack Mariupol from the east, likely to pin defenders in the city as they are encircled.

Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.

Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.

February 27, 2022

Russian President Vladimir Putin put Russia’s nuclear and strategic missile forces, described as “deterrence forces,” on their highest alert status in response to “aggressive statements in the West” on February 27.

Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours.

Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.

Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.

Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.

Russian forces continued to advance north from Crimea towards Zaprozhia and, in conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.

Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.

Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.

The Belarusian government is setting information and legal conditions to justify a Belarusian offensive against Ukraine and the imminent deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus as of February 27.

US and allied sanctions against Russian banking will likely crush Russian foreign currency reserves, depleting the value of the ruble and risking Russian hyperinflation.

The European Union announced direct military aid to Ukraine for the first time in EU history on February 27.

Germany announced a dramatic reorientation of its foreign policy to mitigate the threat that Russia poses to Germany and its allies. Germany will prioritize military spending and energy independence despite short-term economic costs.

The Russian military has likely recognized that its initial expectations that limited Russian attacks would cause the collapse of Ukrainian resistance have failed and is recalibrating accordingly. The Russian military is moving additional combat resources toward Ukraine and establishing more reliable and effective logistics arrangements to support what is likely a larger, harder, and more protracted conflict than it had originally prepared for. The tide of the war could change rapidly in Russia’s favor if the Russian military has correctly identified its failings and addresses them promptly, given the overwhelming advantage in net combat power Moscow enjoys. Ukrainian morale and combat effectiveness remain extremely high, however, and Russian forces confront the challenge of likely intense urban warfare in the coming days.

Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on February 26-27 but will likely resume offensive operations and begin using greater air and artillery support in the coming days. Russian airborne and special forces troops are engaged in urban warfare in northwestern Kyiv, but Russian mechanized forces are not yet in the capital. Russian forces conducted limited attacks on the direct approaches to Kyiv on both banks of the Dnipro River, but largely paused offensive operations in northeastern Ukraine. Russian forces likely paused to recalibrate their – to date largely unsuccessful – approach to offensive operations in northern Ukraine and deploy additional reinforcements and air assets to the front lines.

Russian forces from Crimea slowly pushed north toward Zaporizhie and the southeastern bend of the Dnipro River and east along the Azov Sea coast toward Mariupol on February 27. Russian forces advancing east from Crimea began initial assaults against Mariupol the morning of February 27. These advances risk cutting off the large concentrations of Ukrainian forces still defending the former line of contact between unoccupied Ukraine and occupied Donbas.

Ukrainian resistance remains remarkably effective and Russian operations especially on the Kyiv axis have been poorly coordinated and executed, leading to significant Russian failures on that axis and at Kharkiv. Russian forces remain much larger and more capable than Ukraine’s conventional military, however, and Russian advances in southern Ukraine may threaten to unhinge the defense of Kyiv and northeastern Ukraine if they continue unchecked.

Russian forces likely conducted an operational pause on the Kyiv axis on February 26-27 to deploy additional supplies and forces forward. Russian forces will likely resume offensive operations against Kyiv in the next 24 hours. Russian troops have not yet committed heavy armor and artillery forces to fighting in Kyiv and will likely need to do so to take the city.

Russian forces largely conducted an operational pause on their current broad front of advance between Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces continue to delay and inflict losses on the Russian advance but will likely not be able to halt further advances if the Kremlin commits additional reserves.

Russian forces entered the city of Kharkiv for the first time on February 27 but remain unlikely to take the city without the use of heavier firepower.

Russian forces have encircled Mariupol from the west and began initial assaults on the city. Russian forces have not made any major territorial gains from the east in Donbas after four days of fighting. Russian forces likely intend to pin Ukrainian forces in place on the line of contact to enable Russian forces breaking out of Crimea to isolate them.

Russian forces continued to advance north towards Zaprozhia and, in conjunction with Russian advances on Mariupol, threaten to isolate Ukrainian forces on the line of contact in Donbas if they do not withdraw.

Russian forces failed to seize Kherson after Ukrainian counterattacks reclaimed it on February 26. An unknown concentration of Russian forces remains on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River and threatens Mikolayiv, however.

Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.

Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.

 Russian air and missile strikes targeted a Ukrainian airbase in western Ukraine to ground the remaining Ukrainian air force the night of February 26-27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces conducted 5 air and 16 missile strikes across Ukraine from midnight to 1pm local time, February 27. Russian strikes targeted the Ivano-Frankivsk airfield, home to Ukraine’s 114th Tactical Aviation Brigade. Russian forces continue to refrain from using the full array of air and missile capabilities available to them. Russian forces will likely increase their use of fires in coming days to overcome heavier-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance, however.

Russian forces in northeast Ukraine continue to face morale and supply issues, likely due to poor planning and ad hoc command structures, as ISW previously forecasted. The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported Russian forces are “experiencing an acute shortage of fuel and food“ and are increasingly using Belarusian rail networks to supply Russian forces in Ukraine.

February 28, 2022

Russian forces are completing the reinforcement and resupply of their troops north and west of Kyiv and launching an envelopment of the capital likely aimed at encircling and ultimately capturing it. This effort will likely accelerate in the next 24-48 hours. Russian operations against Kyiv are Moscow’s main effort. Russian troops are also undertaking three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa. The three supporting operations are active, with the operation against Mariupol making the most progress in the last 24 hours.

Russian troops claim to have encircled Mariupol and have reportedly entered the city of Kherson in the south. Russian forces are receiving needed supplies and reinforcements that may facilitate much more rapid and effective operations in the coming 24-72 hours. The Russian effort around Kyiv remains poorly organized, however, with elements of many different battalions combined into what seem to be ad hoc groupings rather than operating under standing regiment or brigade headquarters. The initial errors in the Russian force composition and organization in Belarus and western Russia that ISW has previously reported on, which contributed to Russian logistical and operational failures around Kyiv, will be difficult to remedy quickly and will likely continue to cause friction and reduce the effectiveness of Russian operations even as supply issues are addressed and reinforcements come into the fight. It remains too early to evaluate the likely effective combat power the added Russian troops will bring.

Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics centers on February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to ground the Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western states to resupply the Ukrainian military.

Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery that it has so far failed to employ in assaults on Kyiv to the city’s western approach on February 27-28. Russian forces will likely launch a renewed assault on western Kyiv on March 1.

The Kremlin largely froze trade in foreign currencies and raised interest rates to halt the Ruble’s freefall on February 28 due to the imposition of Western sanctions. The ruble fell over 30 percent against the dollar on February 28.

The United States and its European allies levied further sanctions targeting the Russian Central Bank, throttling Russia’s ability to prop up the ruble. Tax havens Switzerland and Monaco joined European Union (EU) sanctions, contravening the Swiss tradition of neutrality.

NATO and EU countries prepared potential sanctions targeting Belarus following a sham constitutional referendum and intelligence suggesting Belarus could join the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The first round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Gomel, Belarus, failed to yield any agreement.

EU and Ukrainian leaders strengthened their push for quick Ukrainian admittance to the European Union. 

NATO and the EU announced more financial and military equipment support to Ukraine, including an EU package amounting to over 500 million euros of military aid. 

Russian shelling of civilian areas in eastern Ukraine and worsening food shortages across the country will likely exacerbate the refugee crisis across Ukraine and into Eastern Europe.

Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on February 28, indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the Kremlin chooses to use air and artillery assets it previously held in reserve.

Russian forces resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after an operational pause on February 26-27.

Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28.

Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of advance from Belarus into western Ukraine.

Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and northeast.

Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along Ukraine’s northern border.

Russian officials downplayed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 27 decision to place Russian nuclear and missile forces on their highest combat readiness orders. The United States declined to change its own alert levels.

 The Russian military is reorganizing its military efforts in an attempt to remedy poor planning and execution based on erroneous assumptions about Ukrainians’ will and ability to resist.  Russian operations around Kyiv remain limited as logistics and reinforcements arrive but will likely resume in greater strength in the next 24 hours. Ukrainian military leaders say that they have used the pause to strengthen Kyiv’s defenses and prepare to defend their capital in depth. The Ukrainian military likely cannot prevent Russian forces from enveloping or encircling Kyiv if the Russians send enough combat power to do so, but likely can make Russian efforts to gain control of the city itself extremely costly and possibly unsuccessful.

March 1, 2022

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely moved Russia’s nuclear alert status to their highest peacetime level on February 27, the second of four possible levels.

The Kremlin admitted Russian casualties in Ukraine for the first time but announced an implausibly low number of killed or wounded.

Ukraine combatted Russian information campaigns while the Kremlin continued censoring information in Russia.

Anti-war protests in Russia continued on March 1 despite mass arrests and government censorship.

European Union (EU) countries are set to expand SWIFT sanctions as more private companies suspend operations and services in Russia.

NATO and EU countries continued providing military aid but reneged on promised fighter jets for Ukraine on March 1.

Private companies and Western governments sanctioned Russian state-affiliated media to combat Russian disinformation and propaganda on March 1.

European and Ukrainian leaders advanced efforts to quickly admit Ukraine to the EU on March 1.

Russian forces are setting conditions to envelop Kyiv from the west and attempting to open a new axis of attack from the east that would let them encircle the capital. It is unclear if Russia has sufficient combat power to complete such an encirclement and hold it against Ukrainian counter-attacks.

Russian forces will likely launch a renewed ground offensive to seize Kharkiv following the air/artillery/missile attack it has been conducting in the past 24 hours.

Russian and Russian proxy forces will likely solidify the “land bridge” linking Rostov-on-Don with Crimea, allowing Russian forces to move more rapidly from Rostov to reinforce efforts further west.

Russia’s successful seizure of Kherson city may allow Russian forces to resume their interrupted drive toward Mykolayiv and Odesa.

Belarusian forces have likely entered the war on Russia’s side despite denials by the Belarusian president.

March 2, 2022

Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 after pausing for resupply from February 27 to March 1 but failed to secure any additional territory.

Russian forces launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv further west than ISW previously assessed—likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts.

Russian forces renewed advances toward northeastern Kyiv on March 2, reaching a line approximately 65km from the city center on that axis.

Russian forces assaulted central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2, likely increasing civilian casualties.

Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender.

Russian forces continued to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson on March 2 and will likely secure the city in the next 24 hours if they have not done so already.

The Russian Ministry of Defense released implausibly low Russian fatality counts for the first time on March 2, preparing the Russian population for the arrival of injured and killed service members back to Russia.

The Kremlin made inconsistent statements regarding negotiations with Ukraine but agreed to a second round of talks scheduled for March 3.

The Kremlin continued trying to control the domestic and international narrative around the invasion by restricting Russian citizens’ freedom of speech and access to information while framing Ukraine and the West as aggressors.

The Kremlin continued to struggle with Western sanctions while it set conditions for longer-term domestic capabilities.

Ukrainian defense officials claimed Ukrainian forces thwarted an assassination attempt targeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after a tip from anti-war Russian intelligence officers on March 1.

Western states announced additional sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus while more private companies suspended operations in Russia.

NATO and EU countries continued delivering lethal military aid to Ukraine on March 2.

International organizations and Western leaders are increasingly concerned about Russia’s indiscriminate targeting of civilians and use of banned weapons as civilian casualties rise.

The UN General Assembly voted on March 2 overwhelmingly in favor of a motion demanding Russia stop military operations in Ukraine; China and India abstained.

Record-setting refugee flows began to strain the support structures in states neighboring Ukraine on March 2.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Ukrainian officials urged caution as Russian forces advanced toward another Ukrainian nuclear power plant on March 1 and 2.

Global oil and gas prices continued to skyrocket despite Western efforts to avoid sanctioning Russia’s energy sector.

Russian forces resumed offensive operations against Kyiv’s western outskirts on March 2 after pausing for resupply February 27-March 1 but failed to secure any additional territory.

Russian forces launched offensive operations in Zhytomyr Oblast, expanding their envelopment of Kyiv further west than ISW previously assessed—likely to outflank stronger-than-anticipated Ukrainian resistance and limited Ukrainian counterattacks in Kyiv’s outskirts.

Russian forces renewed advances towards northeastern Kyiv on March 2, reaching a line approximately 65km from the city center on that axis.

Russian forces assaulted central Kharkiv and continued to heavily bombard the city on March 2.

Russian forces fully encircled Mariupol as of March 2 and are conducting a deliberate campaign to destroy critical civilian infrastructure and residential areas in a likely attempt to force the city to surrender.

Russian forces continued to reduce pockets of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson on March 2 and will likely secure the city in the next 24 hours if they have not done so already.

March 3, 2022

Russian forces opened a new line of advance from Belarus south toward Zhytomyr Oblast, west of Kyiv, as Russian forces attempting to encircle Kyiv from the northwest were driven further west by determined Ukrainian resistance and counterattacks. Russian forces will struggle to complete an encirclement of Kyiv at all if they have to advance along ring roads as far from the city center as those they are now using.

Russian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro River remain unable to secure the important town of Chernihiv or to break through Ukrainian defenses in the northeastern outskirts of Kyiv.

Russian ground forces have remained relatively static near Kharkiv as Russian artillery, air, and missile bombardments wreak devastation in the city, though the Ukrainian military indicates that a regiment-sized Russian formation will try to envelop or bypass Kharkiv in the coming days.

Russian forces are attempting once again to open a line of advance through northern Luhansk Oblast, possibly to assist efforts at Kharkiv or, as the Ukrainian General Staff assesses, to drive on Dnipro and Zaprozhya. The Russian forces currently reported as engaging in that drive are far too small to attack either city successfully and are probably insufficient to sustain a long drive on their own.

Russian troops have surrounded Mariupol and are attacking it brutally to compel its capitulation or destroy it.

The mayor of Kherson conditionally surrendered to the Russians, allowing Russian forces to renew their advance on Mykolayiv. The Ukrainian military nevertheless reportedly defeated an attempted Russian air assault to take an airfield near Mykolayiv.

The Kremlin escalated domestic censorship of Ukraine coverage and accused Western platforms of launching disinformation campaigns.

Sweden and Finland are increasing cooperation with each other and NATO and may consider NATO membership due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Georgia and Moldova officially applied to join the European Union.

Western intelligence sources reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping had prior knowledge of the Russian invasion and asked Russia to delay operations until after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics.

The Russian military has continued its unsuccessful attempts to encircle Kyiv and capture Kharkiv. The Russians continued to attack piecemeal, committing a few battalion tactical groups at a time rather than concentrating overwhelming force to achieve decisive effects. Russian commanders appear to prefer opening up new lines of advance for regiment-sized operations but have been unable to achieve meaningful synergies between efforts along different axes toward the same objectives. They have also continued conducting operations in southern Ukraine along three diverging axes rather than concentrating on one or attempting mutually supporting efforts. These failures of basic operational art—long a strong suit of the Soviet military and heavily studied at Russian military academies—remain inexplicable as does the Russian military’s failure to gain air superiority or at least to ground the Ukrainian Air Force. The Russian conventional military continues to underperform badly, although it may still wear down and defeat the conventional Ukrainian military by sheer force of numbers and brutality.  Initial indications that Russia is mobilizing reinforcements from as far away as the Pacific Ocean are concerning in this respect. Those indications also suggest, however, that the Russian General Staff has concluded that the forces it initially concentrated for the invasion of Ukraine will be insufficient to achieve Moscow’s military objectives.

Operations to envelop Kyiv remain Russia’s main effort. Russian troops are also continuing three supporting efforts, one to seize Kharkiv, one to take Mariupol and secure the “land bridge” connecting Rostov-on-Don to Crimea, and one to secure Kherson and set conditions for a drive west toward Mykolayiv and Odesa.

The Russian attack on Kyiv likely consists of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and a supporting effort along the axes from Chernihiv and Sumy to encircle it from the east.

Russian forces in the south resumed offensive operations toward Mykolayiv on March 3 after securing Kherson on March 2, but do not appear to pose an imminent danger to Odesa. Russian forces likely seek to force Mariupol to capitulate by destroying critical civilian infrastructure and killing civilians to create a humanitarian catastrophe—an approach Russian forces have repeatedly taken in Syria.

Russian forces opened a new line of advance from Belarus south toward Zhytomyr Oblast, west of Kyiv, as Russian forces attempting to encircle Kyiv from the northwest were driven further west by determined Ukrainian resistance and counterattacks. Russian forces will struggle to complete an encirclement of Kyiv at all if they have to advance along ring roads as far from the city center as those they are now using.

Russian forces on the east bank of the Dnipro River remain unable to secure the important town of Chernihiv or to break through Ukrainian defenses in the northeastern outskirts of Kyiv.

Russian ground forces have remained relatively static near Kharkiv as Russian artillery, air, and missile bombardments wreak devastation in the city. The Ukrainian military indicates that a regiment-sized Russian formation will try to envelop or bypass Kharkiv in the coming days. Similar Russian attempts at such operations elsewhere in Ukraine render the success of such an undertaking at that scale unlikely.

Russian forces are attempting once again to open a line of advance through northern Luhansk Oblast, possibly to assist efforts at Kharkiv or, as the Ukrainian General Staff assesses, to drive on Dnipro and Zaprozhya. The Russian forces currently reported as engaging in that drive are far too small to attack either city successfully and are probably insufficient to sustain a long drive on their own.

Russian troops have surrounded Mariupol and are attacking it brutally to compel its capitulation or destroy it.

The mayor of Kherson conditionally surrendered to the Russians, allowing Russian forces to renew their advance on Mykolayiv, which they have done. The Ukrainian military nevertheless reportedly defeated an attempted Russian air assault to take an airfield near Mykolayiv.

V. Synopsis of first week of Military Operations and Assessment

1. Russian Initial Air Campaign

   – Incomplete air campaign targets Ukrainian air defenses, supply depots, and airfields.

   – Ukrainian Air Force and command and control largely intact.

2. Russian Air and Missile Capabilities

   – Russian attack includes missiles and bombers, but fails to cripple Ukrainian assets.

   – Unexpected Russian failure allows stiffer Ukrainian defense.

VI. Predictions and Immediate Lead-up

1. Putin’s Planned Deployment

   – Anticipation of overt Russian deployment into proxy-controlled Ukrainian territory.

   – Potential invasion of Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts, and other areas.

2. Proxy Requests and Parliamentary Approval

   – DNR and LNR request Russian intervention.

   – Putin secures unlimited parliamentary approval for deploying Russian forces abroad.

VII. Diplomatic and Economic Ramifications

1. International Response

   – Recognition of DNR and LNR as invasion, leading to sanctions and international condemnation.

   – Calls for Western military support for Ukraine.

2. Economic Fallout

   – Russian stock market and Ruble decline.

   – US and EU leverage aggression to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas.

Continuation of Report and Outline: Russian Invasion of Ukraine – Military Analysis and Implications

VIII. Developments and Ongoing Operations

*Date: February 26, 2022*

1. Russian Offensive Strategies

   – Russian forces failing to encircle and isolate Kyiv as planned.

   – Mechanized drives into Kyiv along narrow and broad fronts.

   – Temporarily abandoning failed attempts at Chernihiv and Kharkiv.

2. Threats in Southern Ukraine

   – Russian successes in the south pose the most significant danger to Ukrainian defenses.

   – Russian forces focus on pinning Ukrainian concentrations in the east.

3. Key Urban Centers and Frontlines

   – Ukrainian forces retake Kherson; Russian drive on Odesa halted.

   – Ukrainian resistance remains effective against Russian advances.

   – Russian forces threaten to encircle Mariupol from the west and east.

4. Russian Forces’ Challenges

   – Growing morale and logistics issues for Russian forces due to poor planning.

   – Ukrainian defenses proving more resilient than expected.

IX. International Reactions and Responses

1. Economic Measures and Military Support

   – Select Russian banks removed from SWIFT; more economic pressure on Russia.

   – Expanded NATO lethal aid shipments and reinforcement of eastern flank.

2. Humanitarian Concerns and Displacement

   – Millions of Ukrainians face displacement internally and throughout eastern Europe.

   – Refugee crisis intensifies as urban fighting escalates.

X. Propaganda and Domestic Reactions

1. Kremlin’s Information Warfare

   – Dual narratives presented to counteract unpopularity of the war in Russia.

   – False claims of Ukrainian actions and Russian successes.

2. Russian Opposition and Crackdowns

   – Emerging anti-war movement faces potential domestic crackdowns.

   – Russian government attempts to control narrative amid growing opposition.

XI. Future Scenarios and Implications

   – Russian forces’ diverse advances and their effects on Ukrainian defenses.

   – Uncertainty around Ukrainian government’s decisions on withdrawal or resistance.

XII. Conclusion and Considerations

   – Ongoing overview of the Russian invasion’s military dynamics and consequences.

   – Challenges and potential outcomes as Russian forces attempt to achieve their objectives.

Analysis and Conclusion

Russian Offensive Strategies and Challenges

– Russian forces are employing multiple lines of advance to encircle and capture Kyiv. They are facing determined Ukrainian resistance and counterattacks, which have hindered their ability to complete an encirclement.

– Russian forces’ attempts to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv have been characterized by piecemeal assaults rather than concentrated overwhelming force. This strategy, coupled with failures to achieve air superiority, indicates shortcomings in Russian operational planning and execution.

– Russian forces are also attempting to secure Kherson, Mariupol, and other key cities. The brutality of their tactics, targeting civilian infrastructure, indicates an attempt to force surrender through humanitarian catastrophes.

– Russian efforts to create a “land bridge” between Rostov-on-Don and Crimea could provide easier reinforcement of their positions.

Ukrainian Defense and International Response

– Ukrainian resistance remains robust, with Ukrainian forces delaying Russian advances, especially around Kyiv and Kharkiv. The Ukrainian military appears to be making strategic adjustments to strengthen its defenses and prepare for urban warfare.

– The international community, including the UN General Assembly and NATO, has expressed concern about Russia’s actions, and various countries have imposed sanctions on Russia and Belarus.

– Western countries, including the EU, are delivering military aid to Ukraine to support its defense efforts. The EU’s direct military aid is a notable shift in its approach.

Russian Strategic Goals and Challenges

– Russia’s main efforts include capturing Kyiv, with supporting operations aimed at Kharkiv, Mariupol, and securing a route to Crimea.

– While Russia’s forces have been reinforced and resupplied, there are indications of logistical challenges, supply shortages, and issues with morale among Russian troops.

– The Russian military’s operational planning and execution appear to be flawed, particularly in terms of coordination, organization, and utilization of forces.

– The military escalation has also prompted economic repercussions for Russia, including the plummeting value of the ruble and potential hyperinflation.

Future Scenarios

– The assessment suggests that Russian forces are likely to intensify their efforts to capture Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other key cities. Their tactics may involve increased use of air and artillery support to overcome Ukrainian resistance.

– While Russia’s numerical advantage remains a significant factor, Ukrainian forces’ high morale and effective resistance are important variables that could influence the outcome of the conflict.

– The potential involvement of Belarusian forces and the impact of international sanctions on Russia’s capabilities remain uncertain factors.

– The report underscores the fluid nature of the conflict, where rapid changes in the situation are likely.

Overall, the analysis of the Battle of Hostomel at the time points to challenges faced by both sides and provides insights into the evolving dynamics of the conflict. It highlights the complexity of modern warfare and the interplay of military, political, and economic factors in determining outcomes.

Conclusions drawn from the failed Russian Airborne Assault on Hostomel Airport – A Case of Overconfidence

Overconfidence has been a recurring enemy in military operations throughout history. This report examines a bold Russian attempt to end its ongoing “special military operation” in Ukraine by seizing Hostomel Airport, near Kiev. The operation relied on the skills of Russian Special Forces and their airlift capabilities. However, the attack was undermined by a belief in the superiority of Russian arms and an intelligence failure regarding the strength of Ukrainian defenses.

I. Introduction

– Overview of the failed Russian airborne assault on Hostomel Airport in Ukraine

II. Background

– Brief history of Hostomel Airport and its significance

– Russian plan to use Special Forces and airlift capability to strike a fatal blow to Ukrainian resistance

III. The Attack on Hostomel Airport

A. Preparing the Assault

– Involvement of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV)

– Russian paratroopers’ combat experience

B. Initial Aerial Assault

– Deployment of Russian attack helicopters and fighter jets

– Ukrainian resistance and downing of Russian helicopters

– Destruction of the Antonov An-225 Mriya transport

C. Airborne Troop Deployment

– Arrival of Russian Mi-8 “Hip” assault transport helicopters

– Efforts to disperse Ukrainian defenders in preparation for further airlifts

IV. The Turning Point

– Resistance from Ukrainian special forces and local fighters

– Killing of Major General Andrei Sukhovetsky, a significant loss for the Russian command

V. Ukrainian Counterattack

– Role of the well-trained 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade

– Ukrainian air support and the use of anti-tank missiles

– Inability to land the Ilyushin transports due to Ukrainian resistance

VI. The Aftermath

– Dispute over the control of Hostomel Airport

– Ongoing fighting and destruction of the airport

VII. Intelligence Failure and Overconfidence

– Failure to assess the strength of Ukrainian defenses

– Belief in token resistance and swift occupation of the airport

– Lack of a contingency plan

VIII. Impact on Russian Offensive

– Setback to Russian intentions

– Campaign’s stagnation north of Kiev and progress in the south

– Challenges posed by Russia’s inability to establish air superiority

IX. Conclusion

– The failed Russian airborne assault on Hostomel Airport as a lesson in overconfidence and intelligence failures