MISSION STATEMENT

1. Situation Enemy forces, identified as elements of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) and Federal Security Service (FSB), are utilizing railway infrastructure to transport strategic military and civilian supplies, including ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers, to forward-deployed units operating in occupied Ukrainian territories. Intelligence assessments indicate the shipment is vulnerable to interdiction within a 50-kilometer stretch of unsecured railway near [REDACTED]. Local resistance cells, comprised of Ukrainian partisan group ALPHA and Russian dissident group OMEGA, are conducting joint unconventional warfare (UW) operations to degrade Russian logistical capabilities and create internal dissent within Russian-controlled territories.

2. Mission Partisan Group ALPHA will conduct a coordinated deception and diversionary attack against a secondary Russian logistical target to draw security forces away from the primary objective. Concurrently, Partisan Group OMEGA will execute a precision sabotage operation against a Russian military railway transport carrying ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer. The target train will be primed to detonate in a controlled manner at a high-casualty zone, maximizing destruction of enemy supplies and infrastructure.

Upon successful execution, a disinformation campaign will be launched to attribute responsibility to anti-Putin Russian insurgents, further fueling internal discord and paranoia among Russian security forces and political leadership.

3. Execution

• ALPHA (Diversionary Element)

• Conduct small-scale direct action (DA) against an identified Russian military checkpoint or fuel depot within a 20km radius of the target railway line.

• Utilize IEDs, small arms, and indirect fire assets to create an immediate security crisis.

• Maintain enemy engagement for a minimum of 30-45 minutes to ensure reaction force commitment.

• Conduct planned withdrawal via pre-established exfiltration corridors and blend into civilian populace.

• OMEGA (Sabotage Element)

• Infiltrate railway target area NLT 2200 hours, [DATE REDACTED], and deploy an IED utilizing the ammonium nitrate shipment as the primary explosive charge.

• Detonate the train at pre-determined high-density rail intersection, causing maximum infrastructure damage and logistical disruption.

• Conduct rapid exfiltration via civilian disguises and established safe houses.

• Disinformation Operations

• Post-operation, resistance operatives will plant false evidence, including fabricated manifestos and digital communications, implicating anti-Putin Russian insurgents.

• Cyber elements will amplify false narratives through social media, Telegram channels, and controlled leaks to independent journalists.

• Objective: Degrade Russian internal trust, incite further domestic insurgency, and force FSB/SVR counterintelligence assets to misallocate resources.

4. Enemy Forces

• Russian Armed Forces (RAF) & Security Apparatus

• Primary Threat: 58th Combined Arms Army, conducting rear-area security.

• FSB Counterinsurgency Units: Monitoring dissident activity and conducting counter-guerrilla operations.

• Rosgvardia (National Guard Units): Responsible for railway security but lacking combat effectiveness.

• Local Pro-Russian Collaborators: Low-level informants and security personnel posing passive threats.

5. Support & Logistics

• All weapons, explosives, and operational materials are sourced from pre-established caches inside the AO.

• Escape routes secured through friendly safe houses and civilian underground networks.

• Cyber and psychological warfare elements in place for post-op deception.6. Command & Signal• Primary comms: Encrypted SATCOM & HF burst transmissions.

• Emergency extraction protocols: Contact via coded signal through pre-established Telegram drop points.

• Mission Success Criteria: Confirmed train destruction, Russian security force misallocation, and credible disinformation dissemination.END STATERussian logistical operations suffer significant degradation, leading to ammunition and supply shortages for frontline units. Russian internal stability is further compromised by increased paranoia and counterinsurgency misallocation. Resistance forces retain operational security and freedom of maneuver for future UW actions.

Signed: Commander, Special Operations Liaison Team (SOLT) Ukrainian Resistance Command